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allegations, i. e. alimony and further relief) may well have
removed some of the uncertainty concerning this question,
and perhaps can be cited to support the view that an
amendment is permissible under such circumstances. The
foundation for the view permitting the amendment is that
all a mensa grounds also entitle one to alimony alone, and
since the Brooks case allows an amendment from alimony
alone and further relief to absolute divorce, it would follow
that an amendment from a partial to an absolute divorce
is permissible. The above problem can be distinguished
from the case of Miller v. Miller,20 which held that plaintiff may elect an a mensa divorce if there is over eighteen
months desertion; but if he does so, he cannot later obtain
an a vinculo divorce for the same ground.
Finally, it must be concluded that the Brooks and Ritz
cases do not fundamentally change local amendment doctrine, when contrasted with previous cases and statutes
on the subject. On the other hand, these cases do clarify
Maryland amendment law to the extent that a suit brought
in the proper jurisdiction may be amended or supplemented, as the case may be, provided a new bill is not
effectuated in the process, but a suit improperly filed in
the first instance may not be amended in the event of an
ouster of jurisdiction by the adversary.

THE INVALIDITY OF UNRECORDED LEASES CONTAINING AN AUTOMATIC RENEWAL CLAUSE,
WHERE LEASE AND RENEWALS MAY EXTEND BEYOND SEVEN YEARS
Schultz v. Kaplan'
This case concerned an unrecorded five year lease renewable from term to term at the option of the tenant and
providing for automatic renewal unless notice of termination was given. Suit was brought to have the lease declared
void under the statute which provides that, "No estate of
inheritance or freehold... or any estate above seven years,
shall pass or take effect unless the deed conveying the same
shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded as herein
provided".2 The Court held that the renewal periods
" 153 Md. 213, 138 A. 22 (1927).
156 A. (2d) 16 (Md. 1947).
Md. Code (1939), Art. 21, See. 1.
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should be tacked together, so that there was a lease for
longer than seven years, and the lease was void since not
recorded. The Court based its decision largely on the fact
that the renewal did not require the execution of a new
lease. "The Maryland cases hold that where leases contain covenants for renewal and a new lease must be executed in order for the tenant to remain in possession of the
property, that the newly executed lease does not tack the
term of rental in the former lease to the term in the new
lease."' Also, "Where no new lease, however, is required
for the tenant
to hold over under the old lease a different
'4
rule exists."
Prior to this decision, the decisions of the Maryland
Court of Appeals seem to follow a consistent pattern in
determining whether a renewal period in a lease will join
onto a previous period so as to make the lease one for a
continuous term of a longer period than limited in statutes.
The question has arisen in situations of two types: one type
of situation is that of the Schultz case, concerning the avoidance of leases because of failure to comply with formalities
required by the statute5 for leases longer than seven years;
and the second type of situation concerns the redemption
statutes6 and arises when there is a lease for less than fifteen years renewable for a term which brings the total to
more than fifteen years, and the lessee asks the right to
redeem the property at a capitalization of six percent (6 o ).
In general, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that in
cases involving the redemption statutes, renewal periods
tack so as to make the property redeemable. In cases involving avoidance of leases, the Court has generally held
that the renewal periods do not tack, thus maintaining
the validity of the leases. The Schultz case is contra on
this point.
As stated above, the Court in the Schultz case distinguishes between leases automatically renewed and leases
requiring the execution of a new lease for renewal. It is
true that some previous Maryland cases do contain a similar
language. However, there are at least two Maryland
cases 7 which hold that the periods of renewal do not tack
4Supra, n. 1, 21.

AIbid, 22.
rSupra,n. 2
6 Md. Code (1939), Art. 21, See. 110 and 111.
7 King v. Kaiser, 126 Md. 213, 94 A. 780 (1915), in which the lease provided "for a period of five years renewable for an additional period of
twenty years", and Sweeney v. Trust Co., 144 Md. 612, 125 A. 522 (1924),
in which the lease was for five years, "with the privilege of re-rental."
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despite the fact that the renewal provisions seem not to
require the execution of a new lease, bearing in mind the
passage from Underhill' quoted with approval by the Court
in the Schultz case. It is not argued here that there is no
basis for the decision of the Court. It is contended that
previous Maryland cases support the Court to a large extent but that the same cases also support another and perhaps more desirable view. This view is based on the idea
that the application should be different depending on
whether the statute involved is the fifteen year redemption
statute or the seven year recordation statute.
Considering the cases involving redemption, first, the
case of Stewart v. Gorter9 seems to be the earliest Maryland case directly on point. The lease was for fourteen
years with a covenant on the part of the lessor for the renewal of the lease for the further term of fourteen years
with the same covenants. It was held in this case that
the periods tack. The next redemption case involving the
point in question is Silberstein v. Epstein.10 The lease was
for a term of ten years renewable for another ten year term.
The second (renewal) lease was not executed until some
three weeks after the first lease had expired and was made
effective as of the day after the date of the expiration of
the previous lease. Suit for redemption was brought while
the second lease was in effect. The Court refused to allow
redemption. However, the facts of this case may be considered to distinguish it so as to make the general rule inapplicable. Suit was brought under the second lease. The
second lease had not become operative until after the first
lease had expired. Therefore, there was a gap of time between the two leases and the period could not be considered
as one continuous period. A later case of Maryland Theatrical Corporation v. Manayunk Trust Co." refers to the
Silberstein case and the Court says, "... there was an interval between the first and second periods.., considering
the lease then in effect and before the Court, it was clearly
apparent that the lease was for a term less than fifteen
years, and therefore irredeemable.' 12 In this Maryland
Theatrical Corporation case the redemption statutes were
involved. The lease was for six years with rights of re12 UNDERHrLL, LANDLORD AND TENANT, Sec. 803: "In the absence of an
express provision that a new lease Is Intended to be executed, the presumption is that no new lease is Intended, but that the lessee is to continue to
hold under the original lease."
9 70 Md. 242, 16 A. 644 (1889).
10 146 Md. 254, 126 A. 74 (1924).
11 157 Md. 602, 146 A. 805 (1929).
22 157 Md. 602, 615, 146 A. 805, 810 (1929).

1948]

SCHULTZ v. KAPLAN

newal for additional terms of eight years and ten years.
The Court allowed redemption. The language in this case
seems especially to support the theory that the rule as to
tacking should be different in cases involving redemption
from the rule involving the avoidance of a lease. The cases
of King v. Kaiser's and Sweeny v. Hagerstown Trust Co.14
are distinguished because, ". . . in neither of these cases
was the application of the redemption statute involved."' 5
Also, the Court quotes a passage from the Stewart case as
follows: "The Act of 1888 was the result of well-rounded
belief that these long leases, with their covenants of renewal, were injurious to the prosperity of the City of Baltimore, and that sound public policy demanded that all leases
hereafter made if for more than fifteen years might be
ended at the option of the tenant or lessee, upon paying the
capitalization of his ground rent at six per centum." In
further reference to this the Court says, "The effect of the
ruling of the Court in the case of Stewart v. Gorter, supra,
is that the legislation in question shall be construed to
carry out its policy.. . 2,16
The language quoted above seems ample to support the
contention that, as a matter of public policy, all leases for
longer than fifteen years, including all renewal periods
specified therein (except commercial leases)1 7 shall give
rise to a right of redemption, whether the renewal arises
automatically or whether execution of a new lease is necessary and obligatory on the landlord at the option of the
tenant. Further support for this contention is provided
by the language of Article 21, Sec. 115, which provides that
the provisions of the redemption statutes, ". . . do not apply
to leases or sub-leases of property leased exclusively for
business, commercial, manufacturing, mercantile or industrial purposes, as distinguished from residence purposes,
where the term of such lease or sub-leases, including all
renewals provided for therein,8 shall not exceed ninetynine years." No reason can be perceived why the legislature should intend to include all renewals in this statute
and not in the other redemption statutes. The omission
can best be explained by the fact that Sections 110 and 111
were passed long before Section 115 and it was never found
necessary to amend, because the Court of Appeals uni10 Supra, n. 7.
14 Ibid.
1

5 Supra, n. 12.

10 157 Md. 602, 611, 146 A- 805, 809 (1929).

1 Md. Code (1939), Art. 21, See. 115.
20 Italics supplied.
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formly held in all cases construing this point as to the redemption statutes (with the exception of the Silberstein
case which is distinguishable on the facts) that renewal
periods were to be included in computing the term of the
lease. It seems clear that public policy demands that long
leases, or leases renewable for long periods, be made redeemable. It should not matter whether the lease is renewed automatically or whether a new lease must be executed, which the landlord is forced to execute by covenants
of the previous lease. The property is as effectively tied up
in one situation as in the other.
The cases of King v. Kaiser19 and Sweeny v. Hagerstown
Trust Co.20 seem to be the only cases prior to the Schultz
case which involve the question of tacking of renewal
periods in order to render void a lease under Article 21,
Section 1. Each of these cases involves a lease for five
years renewable for an additional term and in each it is
sought to have the lease declared void under this statute,
and in each the Court refused to tack the renewal period
to the original term so as to render the lease void. In the
King case the Court refers to the Stewart case and says,
"... a reading of that opinion cannot fail to disclose the
fact that what has been attempted in that case was a deliberate evasion of the Acts of 1884, Chapter 485, and 1888,
Chapter 395, intended to put an end to irredeemable leases.
Thus that case is wholly inapplicable to a case like the
present."'" In the Sweeny case the Court quotes this language with approval. If the hypothesis is accepted that
cases involving application of the redemption statutes are
inapplicable to cases involving the avoidance of leases under Article 21, Section 1, it must be concluded that the
Court of Appeals in the Schultz case should have based
its decision on the authority of these two cases, both of
which reach a different conclusion than the Court reached.
All the cases cited in the Schultz case as authority for the
position of the Court on the question of tacking involve
the redemption statutes, except the King case and the
Sweeny case, both of which hold that the renewal period in
the leases concerned did not tack so as to cause the leases to
be void.
Briefly stated, the rule of the Schultz case is that renewal periods in a lease tack if the renewal is automatic,
not requiring the execution of a new lease. To the writer
I20ISupra,
n.
Ibid.
21

7.

126 Md. 213, 221, 94 A. 780, 783 (1915).
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there does not seem to be any imperative difference between a renewal which occurs automatically unless notice
of termination is given by someone who has the option to
terminate, and a renewal which is the result of an election
to renew by someone who has the option. It seems to the
writer that no distinction should be made between leases
renewed unless terminated and leases terminated unless
renewed. Both types of leases should be held to be either
valid or void under the same conditions. It may be suggested that leases for a term less than seven years, with
renewal periods which extend the total life of the lease to
more than seven years and not executed and recorded with
the proper formalities for a lease longer than seven years,
might be held valid for the original term and those renewal
periods which, when added to the original term, do not extend the life of the lease beyond seven years. Perhaps such
a compromise would carry out the legislative intent of requiring certain formalities for the execution of leases over
seven years, and yet would leave the parties to a contract
as nearly as possible in the positions in which they voluntarily placed themselves.

